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I. INTRODUCTION
Employers speak to workers about a wide range of job-related
topics that include the terms and conditions of employment, business
projections, and applicable workplace legal protections. Employers'
communications on these subjects can, and often do, valuably inform
workers' decisions about jobs and other weighty issues. But
employers' speech - in particular their lies and misrepresentations -
about these matters can also inflict substantial harm by distorting
workers' decisions of great life importance. That employers enjoy
advantages of information and power further enhances their ability to
manipulate or coerce workers' choices through lies and
misrepresentations. Efforts to articulate employers' legal duties of
honesty and accuracy should thus be informed by a functional, rather
than formalist, understanding of the information and power dynamics
within this relationship.
. Professor and Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in Constitutional Law, University of
Colorado School of Law. Thanks to Rachel Arnow-Richman, Roberto Corrada, Matt Finkin,
Beto Juarez, Scott Moss, Nantiya Ruan, and participants at the Labor Law Group Conference
on the Restatement of Employment Law for thoughtful comments, and to Benjamin Hand-
Bender for excellent research assistance.
1. I have addressed these issues at length elsewhere. See Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in
the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REv. 31 (2016).
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Chapter 6 of the Restatement of Employment Law explores
whether and when employers' dishonest or inaccurate speech is, or
should be, actionable. Sections 6.01 and 6.02 address the defamatory
harms of employers' knowingly or recklessly false statements about
employees to third parties, while sections 6.03 and 6.04 address
employers' wrongful interference with workers' employment
opportunities - which sometimes takes the form of lies and
misrepresentations to third parties. Other causes of action, such as the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, may also impose duties of
honesty or accuracy with respect to employers' speech to or about
workers.2
This Essay focuses specifically on sections 6.05 and 6.06 of the
Restatement of Employment Law, which address employers' duties of
honesty and accuracy in their communications to workers themselves
as articulated by the torts of fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentation. The Essay starts by explaining how and why law
imposes duties of honesty and accuracy on speakers (including but
not limited to employers) who experience information or power
advantages over their listeners. It then draws upon this background to
evaluate the Restatement's attention to these information and power
asymmetries in its discussion of employers' fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentations to workers. It concludes that the Restatement and
its commentary do not consistently attend to these dynamics - in
particular, by failing to recognize the breadth of situations in which
employers enjoy structurally unequal and thus special access to key
information, and by discounting the ways in which these asymmetries
can lead workers to rely to their detriment on employers'
misrepresentations. Despite the Restatement's limitations in this
regard, judges can and should keep these dynamics in mind when
considering claims of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation in the
employment context - as should legislators and other policymakers
considering workplace policy to inform and empower workers.
2. See James J. Brudney, Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing in American Employment Law, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 773, 782-85, 795-98 (2011)
(discussing cases alleging employers' lies and misrepresentations).
3. As I have explored elsewhere, the information and power asymmetries within the
employment relationship justify certain affirmative disclosure requirements in addition to duties
of honesty and accuracy. Such requirements, however, have generally been imposed by statute
rather than through the common law. See Norton, supra note 1, at 32-33.
EMPLOYERS' DUTIES OF HONESTY AND ACCURACY
II. KNOWLEDGEABLE AND POWERFUL SPEAKERS' DUTIES OF
HONESTY AND ACCURACY
Law often, and appropriately, imposes duties of honesty and
accuracy upon speakers in communicative relationships where
listeners have less access to key information than speakers. As just
one illustration, law frequently addresses the informational
disadvantage experienced by consumers as listeners in prohibiting
misrepresentations by, and requiring certain disclosures of,
commercial speakers.! Other examples include speech by
professionals and other fiduciaries to their clients and beneficiaries
who, rely on them for important advice and guidance: law often
prohibits these professionals' lies and misrepresentations and requires
them to make truthful disclosures of their listeners' options and risks
because their dishonesty or inaccuracy threaten especially grave
harms.6
Relatedly, law often imposes duties of honesty and accuracy
upon speakers in relationships in which listeners are dependent on or
vulnerable to comparatively powerful speakers in various ways. These
include relationships in which speakers have the ability to coerce or
otherwise control their listeners. As an illustration, consider situations
in which speakers hold their listeners "captive" in some respects, as
the Court "permits the government to prohibit offensive speech when
the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech."7
The workplace relationship similarly involves information
imbalances that justify enforceable expectations of employers'
honesty or accuracy in their speech to workers about jobs and related
matters of great life importance. Indeed, the employment relationship
is riddled with information differentials: employers know
considerably more than workers about the terms and conditions of
4. See id. at 52-60.
5. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to governmental requirement that
commercial speakers disclose certain factual information about their products and services);
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-64 (1980)
(stating that false commercial speech frustrates listeners' informational interests and thus
receives no First Amendment protection from government regulation).
6. See PAUL HORWITz, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 248-50 (2013).
7. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988); see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.,
Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) ("[W]hile targeted picketing of the home threatens the
psychological well-being of the 'captive' resident, targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic
threatens not only the psychological but the physical well-being of the patient held 'captive' by
medical circumstance.").
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employment, about economic projections and business prospects, and
often (as repeat players with comparatively greater resources) about
workplace legal protections. Employers thus enjoy what Kim Lane
Scheppele calls "structurally unequal access to information," which
"occurs when one actor can obtain information more easily than
another actor can - and can do so because she holds some special
position that provides a shortcut, as it were, to find out the
information."'
Workers also experience economic and expressive inequalities
that limit listeners' traditional remedies of exit and counterspeech, as
employers exert power over workers' livelihoods and sometimes even
over their physical liberty (e.g., by compelling workers' attendance at
"captive audience" meetings9). As Cynthia Estlund observes,
"[P]articularly in the private sector, employers enjoy nearly
untrammeled power to censor and punish the speech of their
employees, subject only to a variety of limited statutory and common
law restrictions."'o Employers' speech to workers thus differs from
that in many other communicative relationships in its significant
potential for manipulation and coercion."
The Supreme Court recognized the ways in which employer
speech can threaten harms of this sort in National Labor Relations
Board v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., where it held that the National
8. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 120-21 (1988); see also id. ("The main
systematic reason why people may not have equal probabilities [of learning certain information]
is that they may be differently situated with respect to the social distribution of knowledge.
They may have structurally unequal access to knowledge. . . . In addition, the two actors may
not be equally capable of making the effort required to find the information. This unequal
capacity can occur because one actor (1) does not even know that the knowledge exists to be
sought out while the other does (the problem of deep secrets), (2) has fewer resources - and so
cannot invest what it takes to acquire the information while the other can (the problem of
economic inequality), or (3) has less intellectual ability or social experience to begin with and so
is unequally matched with more savvy partners (the problem of unequal facility).").
9. See Paul M. Secunda, Addressing Political Captive Audience Workplace Meetings in the
Post-Citizens United Environment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 17, 19-22 (2010), available at <http://
www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/addressing-political-captive-audience-workplace-meetings-in-th
e-post-citizens-united-environment> (explaining how employers may compel worker attendance
at such "captive audience" meetings through threats of job loss or disciplinary action).
10. Cynthia Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEx. L. REv. 687, 689 (1997); see also Jeffrey M. Hirsch,
Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of Employee
Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2011) (discussing various "restrictions on
employee discourse, particularly the restrictions on employees' ability to access and discuss
relevant information").
11. The employment relationship thus involves both the moral and epistemic features that
Seana Shiffrin identifies as triggering heightened expectations for comparatively knowledgeable
or powerful speakers' honesty and accuracy. See SEANA SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON
LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 132 (2014).
EMPLOYERS' DUTIES OF HONESTY AND ACCURACY
Labor Relations Act prohibited an employer's false threats that
employees would lose their jobs if they voted to unionize.1 2 The Court
emphasized workers' economic dependence on their employers in
explaining why the employer's speech constituted an actionable
"threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion":
"[A]ny balancing of [workplace] rights must take into account the
economic dependence of the employees on their employer, and the
necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick
up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily
dismissed by a more disinterested ear."13 Moreover, as Kent
Greenfield explains, the harms threatened by employer
misrepresentations are unusually high: "[W]hen a company defrauds
an investor about an investment, the damage is to savings. When a
company defrauds a worker about her work, the damage is to
subsistence."14
III. THE RESTATEMENT'S APPROACH TO EMPLOYERS' HONESTY
AND ACCURACY
The reality that employers enjoy significant informational and
power advantages over their workers should inform any articulation
of their legal duties of honesty and accuracy when speaking to
workers. As discussed in more detail below, the Restatement and its
commentary are inconsistently attentive to these functional realities
by failing to recognize the breadth of situations in which employers
enjoy structurally unequal and thus special knowledge of key
information and by discounting the ways in which these asymmetries
can lead workers to rely to their detriment on employers'
misrepresentations.
A. Section 6.05 on Fraudulent Misrepresentations: Articulating
Employers' Duty of Honesty
Section 6.05 provides for employer liability for certain knowingly
12. 395 U.S. 575, 618-19 (1969). In certain contexts, an employer's promise of benefits can
sometimes operate as coercively as its threats of reprisal. See NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375
U.S. 405, 409 (1964) ("The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion
of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the source of
benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow and which may
dry up if it is not obliged.").
13. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618.
14. Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protections in the Labor
Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715, 760 (1997).
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false statements (those of "fact, current intent, opinion, or law")
accompanied by a certain motivation ("intentionally inducing a
current or prospective employee") that is successful in achieving
certain results ("to enter, maintain, or leave an employment
relationship" or "to refrain from entering into or maintaining an
employment relationship with another employer").
Here section 6.05 draws from the Restatement (Second) of Torts
in taking an appropriately broad view of the scope of employers'
misrepresentations that would breach this duty of honesty to include
those of "fact, current intent, opinion, or law." 15 More specifically:
Knowingly False Statements of Fact: Employer
misrepresentations about a wide range of factual matters related to
the terms and conditions of employment - such as pay, benefits,
hours, hazards, job security and opportunities for advancement - can
and do inflict substantial harm.6 Indeed, employers' lies and
misrepresentations about the factual terms and conditions of
employment can distort and sometimes even coerce workers'
important life decisions - for example, decisions about whether to
take, decline, keep, or leave a job. 7
Knowingly False Statements of Current Intent: As the
commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Torts (from which section
6.05 often draws) observes, "[t]he state of a man's mind is as much a
fact as the state of his digestion."8  Examples of fraudulent
misrepresentations of intent include an employer's knowingly false
claims to workers that it had no plans to move or shut down, or its
false claims that it planned to expand a position's job responsibilities
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) ("One who
fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law for the purpose of
inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the
other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation.").
16. See Greenfield, supra note 14, at 719-21 ("[T]here are abundant examples of
companies that mislead their employees. These companies may cause their employees to
believe, for instance, that their jobs are more secure than they in fact are, that their jobs will be
better than they actually turn out to be, or that their health benefits are assured after etirement
when in fact they can be revoked at the will of the company."); Richard P. Perna, Deceitful
Employers: Common Law Fraud as a Mechanism to Remedy Intentional Employer
Misrepresentation i Hiring, 41 WILLAMETTE L REV. 233, 234-38 (2005) (describing examples of
workers' detrimental "reliance on false statements or promises the employer made during pre-
hiring negotiations").
17. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 6.05, illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); see also Cruz
v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 141-43 (4th Cir. 2014) (describing an employer's lies to her prospective
employee about the job's pay, hours, benefits, and other working conditions that induced the
applicant to take a job to her great detriment).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. a.
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and pay."
Knowingly False Statements of Opinion: As comment b to
section 6.05 explains, "[a]n employer's intentional misrepresentation
of opinion about the future of its business may be intended to induce
acceptance of employment," observing that "[t]his is true particularly
when the maker is understood to have special knowledge of facts
unknown to the recipient."" The commentary does not offer an
illustration of an employer's misrepresentation of opinion, but
examples include knowingly false statements of opinion that the
employer is complying with employment law protections, or opinions
about the safety or other quality of working conditions.2 1
Knowingly False Statements of Law: Finally, employers' lies or
misrepresentations about workers' legal rights can frustrate key
workplace protections by skewing workers' decisions about whether
to engage in a wider range of protected activity - such as decisions
about whether to unionize, report illegal workplace conditions, take
family or medical leave, or advocate for different terms and
conditions of employment.2 Here too the commentary does not offer
an illustration of an employer's misrepresentation of law, but
examples abound. Consider one recent instance, where an employer's
employee handbook denied the existence of federal and state laws
that require overtime pay: "There is no overtime pay as there is no
shortage for qualified labor. Any hours worked beyond 40 are paid
straight-time and it is understood by the employee that the extra
hours are a privilege."3 Other examples might include an employer's
knowingly false assertions to its workers that its compulsory
noncompetition agreements complied with applicable law.24
19. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 6.05, illus. 2.
20. Id. at cmt. b.
21. For a related example, see Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus.
Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1327-28 (2015) (indicating that a CEO's statement of belief that
the company's contracts complied with applicable law could be actionable under section 11 of
the Securities Act either if the speaker did not actually hold that belief or if the statement
conveyed untrue facts about the basis for the speaker's belief).
22. See Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An Argument for Informing Employees of
Their Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 455 (1995)
(describing employers' misrepresentations of law in union organizing campaigns).
23. Reyes v. Snowcap Creamery, Inc., No. 11-cv-02755-JLK-KMT, 2014 WL 2459740, at *6
n.3 (D. Colo. June 2, 2014). Note too that employers' misrepresentations of law may sometimes
constitute unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (which would
then, however, pre-empt statute tort claims). See Norton, supra note 1, at 40-42 (discussing cases
in which employers' misrepresentations of law have been found to violate the NLRA).
24. See Complaint at 12-13, Illinois v. Jimmy John's LLC, No. 2016-CH-07746 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
filed June 8, 2016), available at <https://will.illinois.edu/nfs/JimmyJohnsComplaintFILED.pdf>
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The commentary to (but, surprisingly, not the text of)f section
6.05 requires an employee's objective as well as subjective reliance on
an employer's misrepresentation before it becomes an actionable
breach of the employer's duty of honesty. Although the commentary
appropriately acknowledges that employers can and do have "special
knowledge" that may induce workers to rely on their
misrepresentations, it fails to recognize the breadth of situations in
which workers may justifiably rely on employers' misrepresentations
about other workers' earnings and related prospects:
If the misrepresentations did not in fact cause the employment
decisions that allegedly harmed the employee, the employer is not
liable under this Section. If the misrepresentations were too
ambiguous for the employee's reliance to be justifiable, the
employer is not liable under this Section, even if the employer
intended to induce reliance. Employees generally cannot justifiably
rely on an employer's general or vague statements predicting future
26
business success or good employment relations.
The illustrations to section 6.05 take a similarly myopic
approach. For example, illustration 6 maintains that an employer is
not liable for intentionally misrepresenting the incomes earned by
other employees in hopes of motivating the plaintiff to sell more
when the plaintiff continued to work for that employer for two years
after discovering them to be misrepresentations. Illustration 7
maintains that an employer is not liable for intentionally
misrepresenting his opinion about a broker's future sales and
earnings prospects, characterizing the broker's reliance on such
statements in accepting the position as unjustifiable. The reporters'
notes describe these as "involv[ing] opinions that do not imply a basis
in facts specially known by the one expressing the opinion" and thus
upon which a worker would not reasonably rely. In so doing,
however, the illustrations and notes fail to recognize that employers
have structurally unequal access to - and thus "special knowledge" of
(alleging that the employer fraudulently required its employees, as a condition of employment,
to sign noncompetition agreements that were illegal and thus unenforceable under state law).
25. Without explanation, the text of section 6.05 fails to identify an express reliance
element, unlike section 525 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (from which it otherwise often
draws heavily). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (including
justifiable reliance as an element of the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation more broadly); see
also RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 6.06(a) (expressly including a reasonable reliance element
in describing the tort of negligent misrepresentation in the employment context).
26. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 6.05 cmt. e; see also id. ("An employee, however, may
justifiably rely on an employer's statement of an opinion the employer knew to be false when
made, if the employee justifiably considered the opinion to be based on special information the
employer - and not the employee - knows about the company.").
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- information regarding the sales and earnings of their other
employees as well as of the business's likely future prospects, and that
workers may thus justifiably rely on employers' misrepresentations
regarding such matters.
The Restatement's commentary also fails to recognize the
functional realities of the employment relationship by maintaining the
availability only of reliance - and not expectation - damages for
fraudulent inducement of a worker's employment decisions. More
specifically, the commentary to section 6.05 provides that
[a]n employer who is liable to an employee for an inducement
through fraudulent misrepresentation may be liable for the
pecuniary losses an employee incurs through reasonably relying on
the misrepresentation, but not for losses resulting from the
employer's failure to provide specific promised benefits or take
other promised actions. 7
Although the reporters' notes to section 6.05 acknowledge that the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (from which the Restatement of
Employment Law often draws) expressly provides for expectation
damages for fraudulent misrepresentations in certain business
transactionsm the notes reject without explanation the extension of
that approach to employment law, stating conclusorily that such a
remedy "has not been adopted in the employment context if the
existence of a contractual bargain is at issue."
In contrast, a functional (rather than formalist) approach to
employers' duty of honesty would support the possibility of
expectation damages when an employer fraudulently induces a
worker's decisions on matters of great life importance. Consider, for
example, an employee who foregoes another attractive - but rare and
time-limited - job opportunity in reliance on her employer's
fraudulent misrepresentation that it planned to promote her. In cases
like this where a comparatively knowledgeable and powerful speaker
engages in intentional misrepresentation, justice and policy
considerations can sometimes require the speaker to provide the
listener the benefit of the bargain as a consequence of its deceit.
Indeed, such an approach would be consistent with section 549(2) of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as its commentary explains:
When the plaintiff has made a bargain with the defendant,
27. Id. cmt. g.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(2) ("The recipient of a fraudulent
misrepresentation in a business transaction is also entitled to recover additional damages
sufficient to give him the benefit of his contract with the maker, if these damages are proved
with reasonable certainty.").
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however, situations arise in which [reliance damages] do not afford
compensation that is just and satisfactory. If the value of what the
plaintiff has received from the defendant is fully equal to the price
he has paid for it or other value he has parted with and he has
suffered no consequential damages, he may be unable to recover at
all under the rules stated in Subsection (1). He may nevertheless ...
have lost the opportunity of acquiring a substitute at the same price
and because of his commitment made or expenses incurred or for a
variety of other reasons he may find rescission of the transaction
and recovery of the price paid an unsatisfactory and insufficient
remedy.
B. Section 6.06 on Negligent Misrepresentations: Employers' Duty of
Care and Accuracy
While section 6.05 articulates an employer's duty not to engage
in knowing misrepresentations to its workers - i.e., a duty of honesty
- section 6.06 articulates a duty to take care to avoid certain
inaccurate representations to its workers. More specifically, section
6.06(a) identifies employers' duty to exercise reasonable care not to
provide false information to current or prospective employees on a
topic about which the employer has "special knowledge" and upon
which the employee may reasonably rely in deciding whether to enter
into or maintain a relationship with that employer. Section 6.06(b)
provides for liability when a breach of this duty intentionally induces
an employee to enter into or maintain an employment relationship
with an employer.
As an initial matter, section 6.06 inexplicably departs from 6.05
in providing for liability only with respect to misrepresentations that
induce an employee to enter into or maintain an employment
relationship, while failing to address those that induce employees to
leave an employment relationship or those that affect a prospective
employee's decision about whether to take or leave a relationship
with another employer." But negligent as well as fraudulent
misrepresentations can cause substantial harm to workers by skewing
such decisions.
Here too, the commentary to section 6.06 fails to recognize the
breadth of situations in which employers enjoy structurally unequal
29. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 6.05 cmt. g. Note that neither the Restatement
(Second) of Torts nor section 6.06 of the Restatement of Employment Law provides for
expectation damages as a remedy for negligent (as opposed to fraudulent) misrepresentations
where the defendant's mental state is less culpable.
30. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing scope of section 6.05).
EMPLOYERS' DUTIES OF HONESTY AND ACCURACY
and thus special access to key information, and discounts the ways in
which these asymmetries can lead workers to rely to their detriment
on employers' misrepresentations. More specifically, the commentary
explains that section 6.06 does not impose a duty of care on
employers to be accurate on matters "about which [the employer] has
no special knowledge" - i.e. "when information about the same topic
is otherwise readily available to the employee" - but goes on to
define special knowledge quite narrowly as
information about the state of the employer's business or the work
opportunity for the current or prospective employee or ... about
who is authorized to offer, terminate or otherwise affect the
employee's employment. Such special knowledge generally does
not apply to representations about the business generally or about
employment at other employers.31
Without explanation, the commentary further distinguishes
negligent from fraudulent misrepresentations in maintaining that
"negligent misrepresentation does not reach the misrepresentation of
opinion or current intention, only the misrepresentation of
information."32 But again, a thoughtful conception of "special
knowledge" would consider the breadth of situations in which
employers enjoy structurally unequal and thus special access to key
information. Contrast section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (from which section 6.06 draws in other respects), which takes
an appropriately broad approach to the types of decisions that may be
harmed by comparatively knowledgeable speakers' negligent
misrepresentations. More specifically, section 552 articulates a duty
of care to be accurate upon a speaker who "in the course of his
business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in
which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions."4 Attention to
information asymmetries in the workplace relationship should
similarly inform our understanding of when and how employers'
misrepresentations - both negligent and fraudulent - of current
intent, opinion, and law as well as fact can manipulate workers'
choices about matters of great life importance.
31. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 6.06 cmt. d.
32. Id. cmt. c; see also id. ("An employer, however, may be liable for negligent
misrepresentation by stating an opinion that conveys false information.... An employer or its
agent may also negligently misstate information about the opinion or current intent of
another.").
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1).
34. Id.
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As another example of the Restatement's failure to attend to the
functional realities of workplace communication, illustration 2
misguidedly focuses on the motivation underlying an employer's
negligent misrepresentation - rather than the employer's privileged
access to the relevant information - as key to liability.35 More
specifically, it claims a meaningful distinction between an employer's
negligent misrepresentation about employees' future prospects with
the firm that sought to boost their morale as opposed to one that
sought to shape their life decisions.36 Whether the two motivations
can be so easily parsed is not at all clear, but in any event, in both
cases the employer enjoys structurally unequal access to the relevant
information, thus inviting justifiable employee reliance. For this
reason, the employer should be understood as breaching its duty to
take care to be accurate.
Illustration 3 similarly fails to recognize the dynamics of
workplace communication as a functional matter, maintaining that an
employer is not liable for negligent misrepresentation when it
carelessly and inaccurately told an employee that her work "was good
enough to warrant a contract for the following year" in response to
the worker's query as to whether she should look for work
elsewhere.37 The commentary asserts that
[s]uch special knowledge generally does not apply to
representations about the business generally or about employment
at other employers. Individuals making such decisions as whether
to enter or maintain an employment relationship generally do not
reasonably rely on information from an interested party who lacks
special knowledge.3 8
But an employer does have structurally unequal - i.e., special -
knowledge of a wide range of matters relevant to the question
whether a worker should seek other employment opportunities, and
an employee's reliance on such statements in making life-shaping
decisions is thus justifiable. To be sure, the law imposes no duty upon
employers to answer employees' questions about their future
prospects - but when employers choose to do so, they should take
care to be accurate.
35. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 6.06 cmt. b, illus. 2.
36. Id.
37. Id. cmt. c, illus. 3.
38. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Efforts to articulate employers' legal duties of honesty and
accuracy should be informed by a functional understanding of the
information and power dynamics within the employment relationship.
The Restatement's discussion of fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentation claims, however, missed a number of opportunities
to emphasize and learn from the ways in which employers'
informational and power advantages enable and exacerbate the
harms threatened by their dishonest or inaccurate speech to workers.
Despite the Restatement's limitations in this regard, judges can and
should keep these dynamics in mind when considering claims of
fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation in the employment context
- as should legislators and other policymakers considering workplace
policy to inform and empower workers.

